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ON THE OBJECTIVE FOUNDATION OF NATURAL-
LAW NORMS 
Ilmar Tammelo* 
Before entering into the topic of the objective foundation of 
natural-law norms I would like to declare my attitude to natural-
law thought. I do not regard myself as its adherent nor its adver-
sary. The controversy of iusnaturalism versus legal positivism 
leaves me rather cold. Often neither party to the controversy 
seems to have a very clear idea of what the opponents stand for. 
Sometimes even the proponents themselves seem to have no clear 
idea what they stand for. Yet iusnaturalism and legal positivism 
are unmistakable intellectual realities. Some of their variations 
appear to be rather foolish or even irresponsible, while others are 
plausible and quite defensible. As for natural-law thought, its basic 
preoccupation is with formulation of the requirements, standards, 
or criteria of goodness, rightness, or excellence of law. 
It may be asked whether it is possible at all for a lawyer or 
legal philosopher to be neither a natural lawyer nor a legal positi-
vist. As for lawyers, it depends on how the respective positions are 
defined. In their historical manifestations, these positions do not 
appear to be dichotomic or mutually exclusive. Intermediate posi-
tions are possible; one may even entertain iusnaturalist ideas on 
some points and legal positivist ideas on others. Of course, ardent 
natural lawyers, like religious or political fanatics, are wont to de-
clare: "He who is not with us is against us!" But fanatics need not 
be taken seriously. The legal philosopher is not required to take 
sides in the natural law controversy at all. A legal philosopher can 
very well consider it as his only task to seek and set out what is 
going on and what is contained in the area of fundamental legal 
thought. 
To provide authority for the norms or normative systems of 
natural law, an objective foundation is sought by natural lawyers for 
this law. Thus they speak of the "derivation" of natural-law norms 
from certain ascertainable facts encountered in social reality or in 
the reality of individual human beings. They employ the phrases 
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"human nature" and "nature of things" for referring to the objective 
foundation of natural law. Usually regarding natural law as know-
able from certain facts, they are inclined to align themselves with 
ethical cognitivism. 
The cognitivist trend in natural law thought is subject to 
challenge by the invocation of the principle of the underivability 
of an "Is" from an "Ought", a principle first formulated by Hume 
and later espoused by Kant. It is still rife to say that there is an 
"unbridgeable gulf between the realms of the Is and the Ought." 
The formulation of the principle in question in such a manner is 
not a sober way of conducting philosophic argument. What is pro-
ported to be said in this way is that it is impossible to logically 
derive value judgments or norms from statements of fact alone. 
There is no metaphysical or other mystery involved in this 
claim. It is based on a basic principle of logic, which admits only 
those elements in a valid conclusion that are present in the premises 
from which it has been derived. This principle is considered a nuis-
ance by most natural lawyers and many moral philosophers. There-
fore, great trouble has been taken to refute or to restrict it. It would 
be instructive to consider what chances exist to remove the hurdle 
which this principle ostensibly imposes on the natural lawyer in his 
effort to provide an objective foundation to the norms or systems of 
natural law. 
A radical way of dealing with the Humean principle is to say 
that logic itself is man-made, and like any human achievement, is 
subject to change and overhaul. Since geometricians have been able 
to construct systems of geometry without the axiom of parallels and 
since logicians have been able to construct systems of logic which 
do not include the law of the excluded middle, why cannot a system 
of logic be constructed that would allow a conclusion to have ele-
ments other than those contained in its premises? 
A simple answer to this question is that the whole idea of formal 
logic, which is based on transformation and not on transmutation 
of formulae, would be lost in this way. Such a system of logic would 
defeat the purposes of cognitivist natural lawyers and moral philoso-
phers. They would like to establish the validity of their derivations 
beyond any doubt. A transmutational logic would provide no such 
certainty. 
It is worth considering whether the principle that a conclusion 
cannot contain elements that are not contained in its premises 
really has a universal validity in formal logic. If it can be shown that 
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this principle has exceptions or requires restriction, the cognitivist 
natural lawyer or moral philosopher could entertain the hope that 
the hurdle of the Humean principle can be surmounted. A ray of 
hope seems to come from the theorem of addition, according to 
which, from any proposition, an alternative proposition can be de-
rived, in which the given proposition is one option, and any other 
proposition whatsoever can be the alternate. Thus, under the 
theorem of addition, from p it is correct to conclude p or q. From 
this it appears that the conclusion contains an element, namely q, 
which is not present in the premise, that is, in p. 
The above argument is sound, but is incapable of affecting 
the Humean principle. According to a firmly established conven-
tion in the construction of inferences in logic, there is no need to 
state the laws of logic, that is, its axioms or its theorems, in the 
premises. All appropriate logical laws can be regarded as belonging 
to the derivation basis of an inference. Thus, the above inference 
can be presented like this: 
If p then p or q 
p 
p or q, 
which shows that the conclusion does not contain any element that 
is not contained in the premises. 
There is also another way which might yield a chance for dis-
puting the universal validity of the logical principle in question. 
According to the theorem of ex {also quodlibet any conclusion 
follows from self-contradictory premises. Accordingly, the con-
junction of a proposition and its negation yields any proposition 
whatsoever. From p and not-p follows q. It may be said that in the 
real world mutually inconsistent states of affairs do not exist and 
thus a self-contradiction can never be posited as a premise in an 
inference relating to the real world. An answer to this objection is 
that in legal reality self-contradictions can very well occur; they do 
occur here in the guise of antinomic norms eventuating here and 
there in legal systems. This rejoinder can by its turn be rebutted by 
pointing out that antinomies are normative phenomena and thus 
the inferences in question do not receive their premises from facts 
but from norms or values. 
If anyone still has the desire to continue the argument along 
these lines, he or she may be disillusioned about the possibility of 
surmounting the Humean principle by the realization that even an 
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inference under the ex {also quodlibet theorem does not produce a 
conclusion that contains an element not contained in its premises. 
For this theorem itself belongs to the derivation basis of the relevant 
inference, which can be expressed as follows: 
If p and not-p then q 
p and not-p 
q 
This expression shows that only a logical transformation, not a 
transmutation, is produced. 
That there is no real hope for cognitivist natural lawyers and 
moral philosophers to derive logically a value judgment or a norm 
from statements of fact alone does not mean that natural lawyers 
have failed in their attempt to provide a rational foundation of 
natural-law norms or systems. They have only lost their chance to 
show that cognitivism in natural-law thought has a logical basis. 
One can still be a good natural lawyer without being a cognitivist 
natural lawyer. If a solid basis for natural-law norms or systems 
cannot be achieved by way of mere verification, one has recourse to 
a different procedure of justification of value judgments or norms, 
a procedure which is proper and "natural" for them. This procedure 
may be called "vindication." 
It is undeniable that facts, too, can be important in the effort 
to show that a value judgment or a norm is well founded. But only 
relevant facts, not mere facts alone count for this purpose. Which 
facts are relevant and which irrelevant in the vindication of a value 
judgment or a norm is determined by the attribution of value-
qualities to facts. A fact endowed with a value-quality constitutes 
a value, and as such is capable of being a reference for a value 
judgment or for a norm. The act of valuation is subjective in the 
sense that a valuating subject endows an object with a value-
quality. However, the participation of the subject in this act does 
not condemn it to be arbitrary, as participation of the cognising 
subject in the act of cognition does not condemn knowledge to be 
arbitrary. Certainly, capricious, unwarranted valuations occur; 
however, there are also valuations preceded by a very careful and 
mature deliberation and supplied with good reasons. 
If the deliberation preceding an act of valuation follows certain 
well-established rules of sound reasoning, superficiality, careless-
ness and narrow-mindedness in passing a judgment are reduced to 
a minimum and the chance of achieving an insightful assent to the 
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judgment resulting from the act is maximized. Such an insightful 
assent provides the rational warrant by which a value judgment or 
a norm is vindicated, that is, established as well founded. 
There are fundamental principles relevant to the assessment of 
the worth of the actual or potential positive-law norms, the cer-
tainty and stability of which are scarcely less than the certainty and 
stability of statements of fact about human individual or social 
reality. For example, there can be little doubt about the require-
ment that the law ought to avoid arbitrary discriminations, that it 
ought to protect the lives of the members of the community, that it 
ought not to impose mutually inconsistent duties, and that it ought 
to be ascertainable. It is possible to challenge even these elementary 
principles oflegal decency, but such a challenge is unlikely to come 
from or impress those who can be taken seriously. However, chal-
lenges have been made that fly in the face of our basic knowledge 
or understanding of the real world. Sollipsists have disputed the 
existence of external reality and sophists have contended that noth-
ing whatsoever exists. 
The conception that a rational foundation cannot be provided 
to norms or systems of natural law by verification of facts which 
bear on human pursuits and that such foundation is essentially 
provided by vindication of the values involved in matters of human 
concern implies a non-cognitivist approach to the problem of justifi-
cation of these norms or systems. It is a matter of course that verifi-
cation plays a role in the framework of vindication, for the justifica-
tion of a value or a norm may be determined from certain facts, 
whose existence must be ascertained. This requires the verification 
of corresponding statements of fact. Among the facts to which fre-
quent reference is made in the justification of natural-law norms are 
certain teleological trends observable in human behaviour; for ex-
ample, the instinct of self-preservation, the inclination of man to 
live in a community, and man's drive to propagate his kind. These 
trends may account for why certain value judgments and their 
corresponding norms are virtually universal and why men almost 
universally endow certain facts with certain values. A teleological 
trend is still a fact and the statement of such a fact is in itself no 
value judgment or norm. 
The term "natural law" meets with no empathy among many 
lawyers and is otherwise objectionable because of misleading 
connotations of the word "nature" and because under the label 
"natural law" some odd ideas have been served in the history of 
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thought. However, it can be argued that the term is far from being 
inappropriate. It can be used by those who reject the cognitivist 
approach to natural law. In English, "nature" means, inter alia, 
what is important, essential, significant, constitutive in a phenome-
non. This aspect of the connotation of "nature" is quite consistent 
with the view that the well-foundedness of a value judgment or a 
norm is established not in the procedure of verification but in the 
procedure of vindication. 
The non-cognitivist natural lawyer can also find a justification 
for the continued use of the term "natural law" through reference 
to the fact that approval based on an insightful assent often finds 
expression through the word "naturally"-namely, when it is said: 
"Naturally, this is right" or "Naturally this ought to be so," 
"naturally" performs here the same function as the expression 
''of course.'' 
It may well be that the term "natural law" has outlived its use-
fulness and that it should be replaced by another expression, under 
whose label that which is sound and of continued value in natural-
law thought would have a better chance to assert itself. However, 
an appropriate alternative term for "natural law" does not seem to 
be readily available. If a proper term can be offered, it may serve 
the purpose of promoting a fruitful interchange of ideas with those 
who have no feeling for the natural law tradition but who are never-
theless concerned with the achievement of high standards of conten-
tual excellence in the creation and application of law. 
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